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SURVEY ARTICLES

Admiralty
by Thomas S. Rue*
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided nine admiralty
cases with written opinions in 1994. In one case the court faced for the
first time the issue of whether a vessel on dry dock was on land or water
for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. In another case the court
interpreted, for the first time, a statute concerning marine sanctuaries.
The other seven cases did not change the law as it exists in this circuit.
This was the case despite a factually attractive opportunity to relax the
court's requirement that a shipper literally comply with the procedures
set forth in the carrier's bill of lading to avoid the $500 package
limitation. Finally, the Government shows no signs of abandoning its
attempts to reverse maritime lien law as it relates to public vessels.

* Partner in the firm of Johnstone, Adams, Bailey, Gordon & Harris, Mobile, Alabama.
University of the South (B.A., cum laude, 1968); University of Alabama (J.D., 1974).
Member, Editorial Board, Alabama Law Review (1972-1974). Member, Board of Directors,
The Maritime Law Association of the United States (1993-present); Member, American Bar
Association and Alabama State Bar Association.
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CARGO

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed two cargo cases both involving package
limitation issues. The first cargo case decided by the Eleventh Circuit,
Marine TransportationServices Sea-Barge Group, Inc. v. Python High

PerformanceMarine Corp.,1 began as a simple suit for freight but ended
up with a substantial counterclaim for conversion. 2 The case arose
when the shipper, Python High Performance Marine Corp., booked a
twenty-foot sealed container of boat parts and three boat molds (one hull
mold and two deck molds) for shipment from Miami to San Juan, Puerto
Rico.' The container was shipped first, freight collect, under a separate
bill of lading. Thei hull mold and one of the two deck molds were bound
together for shipment. The deck mold that remained separate disappeared before shipment. Despite this, the bill of lading issued for the
shipment of the two-mold set reflected that three packages of break bulk
boat molds were shipped. The bill of lading also noted that a request
and charge for insurance had been made by the shipper.4
When the shipment reached San Juan, the consignee refused to accept
the cargo ostensibly because of the missing deck mold. When the
shipper contacted the carrier's traffic manager he told the shipper to file
a claim for the lost deck mold. The traffic manager also offered to
return all the cargo to Miami at no charge and said that the freight for
the Miami-San Juan voyage would be deducted from the proceeds of the
claim." When the container and two-mold set arrived back in Miami,
the shipper went to the terminal to pick up the cargo but on that
occasion was told by the same traffic manager that he would have to pay
the freight charges on the two-mold set for the Miami to San Juan trip
before he could pick up the cargo. The traffic manager referred the
shipper to its claims manager who confirmed that the freight would have
to be paid prior to the release of the cargo.'
The shipper obtained a corporate check in the amount of the freight
and returned to the terminal to obtain the cargo. On that occasion the
traffic manager refused to accept the check and told the shipper that he
could not release the cargo and that
the shipper would have to wait to
7
hear from the carrier's attorney.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

16 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1135-36.
Id. at 1136.
Id.
Id. at 1137.
Id.
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The container and two-mold set, which had deteriorated beyond repair
due to exposure to the elements, remained in the carrier's possession.
The carrier brought suit to recover freight due for the carriage of the
container and the boat molds from Miami to San Juan and for the return
trip to Miami. The carrier also asked for demurrage on the cargo while
it remained in the carrier's possession in San Juan and Miami. The
shipper counterclaimed for the loss of the boat mold and for conversion
of the container and two-mold set because of the carrier's refusal to
release the cargo.'
The district court found that the carrier was entitled to recover the
freight charges and interest but denied its claim for demurrage since the
delay had been occasioned by the carrier, and under such circumstances
a provision in the bill of lading provided that no demurrage would be
payable. 9 On the counterclaim, the district court held that the carrier
was liable to the shipper for the missing mold plus interest." The
district court held that the $500 package limitation was not applicable
because the shipper had declared a $100,000 value on the boat mold and
incurred a $50 insurance charge, in accordance with the bill of lading
requirements to avoid the package limitation." The district court
further found that the carrier had converted the container and two-mold
set by refusing to release the cargo when the carrier tendered a
corporate check in payment for the freight. 2 The court denied the
shipper's claim for lost profits because the agreement between the
shipper and its consignee had not been consummated."
While both parties in the district court relied on Florida law on the
issue of equitable estoppel, 4 the court of appeals, under admiralty
jurisdiction, applied general maritime law.'5 The court of appeals then
recited the requirements of the doctrine: "(1) a representation of fact by
one party contrary to a later asserted position; (2) good faith reliance by
another party upon the representation; and (3) a detrimental change in
position brought by the later party due to the reliance."' 6

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1139 n.S. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the elements of equitable estoppel
under the clearly erroneous standard, and the issue of whether the district court correctly
applied equitable estoppel was reviewed de novo. Id. at 1138.
15. Id. at 1139 n.8.
16. Id. at 1139.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1216

[Vol. 46

In the district court, the issue concerning equitable estoppel was
whether the carrier could insist on payment in United States currency.17 In the Eleventh Circuit, using a slightly different analysis the
court focused on whether the carrier, having communicated to the
shipper that there was nothing it could do to retrieve the cargo, could,
at trial, take the position that all the shipper had to do was to tender
cash or a cashier's check."' Tb the court of appeals this constituted a
representation of material fact contrary to a later asserted position.19
The court of appeals found that the shipper relied on the representation
because the shipper assumed that nothing it could do would result in the
release of the cargo.'
Lastly, the court of appeals found that the
shipper's position had been detrimentally changed since the carrier now
demanded demurrage in addition to the freight; moreover, the two-deck
mold set had deteriorated beyond repair and the shipper was defending
a lawsuit.2
The court of appeals quickly disposed of the carrier's argument that
the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction of the
shipper's land-based claim of conversion.22 The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned: "[The] counterclaim for conversion arose directly from the
same transaction or occurrence upon which [the carrier's] complaint
[was] founded. As such it was a compulsory counterclaim. Therefore,
the district court had ancillary jurisdiction in admiralty to hear the
counterclaim."' With that foundation the court of appeals concluded
that the district court properly entertained the shipper's state law
conversion claim since no independent basis for federal jurisdiction is
required for ancillary jurisdiction.24 The court of appeals went on to
find that the carrier wrongfully deprived the shipper of the property
when the carrier refused the corporate check tendered by the shipper.25
The Eleventh Circuit noted that pursuant to Florida law "'[the essence
of the tort is not the acquisition of the property; rather, it is the
wrongful deprivation. '"'
The court of appeals also rejected the carrier's alternative argument
that the district court erred in not applying the doctrine of avoidable

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1139.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)).
Id.

25. Id.
26. Id. at 1140.
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consequences.27 The carrier argued that when the shipper learned
that the carrier would not accept its corporate check, the shipper had a
duty to mitigate and avoid the consequences of the carrier's action, i.e.,
tender cash or a cashier's check. The carrier lost this argument because
it had never informed the shipper of why it had rejected the corporate
check.' According to the court of appeals, "[mlanifest in this doctrine
is the assumption that the injured party knows what reasonable efforts
to use to mitigate damages.""
In urging its claim for demurrage, the carrier contended that it was
due demurrage because the shipper had failed to file a written claim for
waiver of demurrage in accordance with the bill of lading. The carrier
also claimed that it was not at fault for the delays which caused the
demurrage."0 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's determination that the shipper's answer denying liability for demurrage met the
bill of lading requirements for a written claim of waiver."1 While at
first glance this appears to have been a fairly weak compliance, in view
of the fact that the carrier made no demand for demurrage prior to trial
it is easier to understand the holding. The court of appeals also affirmed
the district court's finding that the demurrage was due to the fault of
the carrier.3 2 In the first instance, the carrier's loss of the deck mold
caused the demurrage in San Juan, and the carrier's conversion caused
the demurrage in Miami. 3
The court of appeals reversed the district court on the package
limitation issue.' 4 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit adhered to its
precedent of requiring literal adherence to the requirements in the bill
While the shipper had
of lading to avoid the package limitation.'
declared a $100,000 value in its booking notice with the carrier, the
court of appeals found this insufficient, holding that "[tihe shipper must
declare the value of its cargo on the face of the bill of lading, not on
some other related documents, to satisfy the valuation requirement."36
The court of appeals noted that while another $100,000 figure appeared
on the bill of lading, it reflected "the amount of insurance coverage [the
shipper] sought, not a declaration of value for the purpose of satisfying

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1141.
Id. See Sony Magnetic Prod., Inc. v. Merivienti O/Y, 863 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
16 F.3d at 1141.
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the valuation requirement." 7 Thus, in order to meet the valuation
requirement and avoid the package limitation, the shipper must declare
the value of the cargo on the face of the bill of lading. The difficulty is
that bills of lading rarely provide a specific place for this declaration. In
the absence, the shipper must declare the value somewhere on the face
other than, or in addition to, the space provided for a declaration of the
amount of insurance sought."
The court of appeals also rejected the district court's finding that the
shipper had satisfied the requirement for paying additional freight by
incurring the $50 charge for insurance.8 9 The court of appeals found
that "t]he additional freight requirement requires shippers to pay an
amount in accord with filed ad valorem rates."40 That rate was two
percent of the total declared value and should have been $200, not
$50. 4' Here again, the Eleventh Circuit, insisting on literal compliance
with the provisions of the bill of lading, found that the shipper did not
satisfy this requirement either.4 2
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the
shipper's lost profits had not been proven with reasonable certainty as
required by Florida law.'
In Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk Line," the court of appeals
again confronted the $500 package limitation. The question arose when
the stevedore was delivering cargo on behalf of an ocean carrier and the
cargo was destroyed. The specific issue before the court was whether or
not delivery was complete.' If delivery was complete, the stevedore did
not enjoy the benefit of the package limitation which it claimed pursuant
to a Himalaya clause.'
Hiram Walker had purchased 5,000 gallons of Tia Maria in Jamaica.
A 23-ton tank containing the liqueur was loaded aboard the M/V
MORANT BAY and shipped to Miami. The carrier hired a stevedore to
unload the tank and store it at the dock.4" Hiram Walker in turn
contracted with an overland carrier to haul the liqueur from Miami to

37.

Id.

38.
39,
40.
41.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

42.

Id.

43. Id.
44. 30 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 1994).
45. Id. at 1372.
46. The Himalaya Clause extends the benefits (in this case the $500 package
limitation) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act to non-carriers in certain instances. Id.
47. Id.
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New Jersey. Part of the agreement between Hiram Walker and the
overland carrier was that the overland carrier was to pump the liqueur
from the tank into its freight trailer.48
When the overland carrier arrived at the port, the stevedore removed
the tank from storage and aligned it with the overland carrier's trailer.
When a needed fitting was missing, the overland carrier asked the
stevedore to help him make a "gravity feed" by raising the tank above
the trailer with a forklift. 49 During the transfer the tank fell off the
forklift and ruptured causing the loss.'
The district court granted a summary judgment in favor of Hiram
Walker finding that the stevedore had been negligent as a matter of
law.51 The district court found that the package limitation did not
apply since the stevedore had acted as a volunteer and not as the
carrier's independent contractor.52
On the first appeal, by the stevedore, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that
the stevedore had been negligent as a matter of law, but reversed the
judgment because there were unresolved factual issues regarding the
stevedore's entitlement to the package limitation. 3 The Eleventh
Circuit remanded to the district court and directed it to determine
whether delivery had already occurred at the time of the spill.' If it
had, the stevedore was not entitled to the limitation.55
After a bench trial, the district court again entered judgment for
Hiram Walker on the negligence issue but limited the stevedore's
liability to $500 by finding that the ocean carrier's responsibility for
delivery had not ended before the spill occurred. 56 Under that scenario,
the stevedore was performing services on behalf of the ocean carrier and
was entitled to the package limitation. In concluding that delivery was
not complete before the spill, the district court relied heavily on Clause
18"7 of the bill of lading." The district court found that language

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52.

Id. at 1372-73.

53. Id. at 1373.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. Clause 18 of the bill of lading provided that "'removal of the goods into the
custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof under the contract of carriage ... shall
be prima facie evidence of the delivery by the Carrier of the goods as described in the bill
of lading.'" Id.
58. Id.
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precluded the possibility of delivery without a change of custody. 9 The
district court applied that standard to the facts, it being undisputed that
the stevedore had never transferred the cargo into the overland carrier's
custody, and concluded that delivery had not occurred.' In essence,
the district court ignored all other evidence of delivery, including a
delivery receipt tendered by the stevedore to the overland carrier before
the spill.
Hiram Walker appealed and the case went to the Eleventh Circuit for
the second time."' On that occasion the Eleventh Circuit held "that the
district court had misinterpreted the bill of lading as identifying change
of custody as the only possible evidence of delivery."62 The Eleventh
Circuit noted that change of custody could be prima facie evidence of
delivery but it was not conclusive evidence.' The Eleventh Circuit
remanded and directed the district court to "develop any facts that would
aid it in determining the point of delivery.'
On remand the district court relied on trial testimony and found that
the issuance of the delivery receipt was either inadvertent or erroneous
because it was inconsistent with the stevedore's customary practice of
issuing delivery receipts and gate passes after physical possession of the
cargo had passed to the consignee.' Under those circumstances the
district court concluded that the stevedore was in the process of
delivering the liqueur when the accident happened and was thus entitled
to the package limitation.' In so holding, the district court found that
the delivery receipt that had been issued by the stevedore before the
spill did not establish when legal delivery took place.67
Hiram Walker appealed again, contending that the district court was
clearly erroneous since there was no evidence that the delivery receipt
had been issued erroneously or that delivery receipts were customarily
issued only after physical transfer of the cargo.' Since the finding of
the district court was one of fact the Eleventh Circuit reviewed it for
clear error. 9 In view of the testimony of the manager of operations
and the general traffic manager of the stevedore, Judge Roney, writing

59. Id.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Hiram Walker & Sons v. Kirk Line, 963 F.2d 327 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id.
Id. at 1373-74.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the majority opinion, found this argument baseless.7" Judge Dubina
concurred specially and said that it did not matter whether the issue of
delivery was purely factual, as viewed by Judge Roney, or a mixed
question of law and fact, as viewed by Judge Tjoflat, delivery had not
occurred under any circumstances.71
Judge Tjoflat dissented, pointing out that the majority and the district
court had confused actual delivery with legal delivery; in effect, they had
equated the two.72 The question in Judge Tjoflat's mind was at what
point had the carrier's duty been fulfilled. 3 If the cargo had been
transferred by pumping, there was a custom and practice which dictated
that the legal delivery from the carrier to the overland carrier would
have been complete once the stevedore had aligned the tank containing
the liqueur with the overland carrier's trailer even though there had
been no physical delivery. Judge Tjoflat observed that such legal
delivery had no connection with the issuance of the delivery receipt,
which was typically made after physical delivery.74 With nothing to
indicate that the delivery receipt had any greater probity in deciding
legal delivery for gravity transfers, Judge Tjoflat preferred to analyze
who had control over the process of the physical transfer.75 Judge
Tjoflat argued that the overland carrier had control of the process of
transfer "and, with it, control of the Tia Maria itself. Legal delivery had
taken place."7" Under those circumstances, Judge Tjoflat favored
remand with instructions for judgment to be entered in favor of Hiram
Walker without regard to the package limitation. 7
II. JURISDICTION
The Eleventh Circuit decided two cases concerning admiralty
jurisdiction and one case involving personal jurisdiction. The first, Sea
Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes,"8 is a case of first impression regarding the issue
of whether a vessel in dry dock was on water or land for purposes of
admiralty jurisdiction. Factually and legally the case is very similar to
Sisson v. Ruby.7 In Sea Vessel, Inc. a fire broke out on a vessel that

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 1377-78 (Dubina, J., concurring).
Id. at 1378 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1378-79. In Judge Tjoflat's opinion that was a question of law, reviewed de

novo. Id. at 1378 n.2.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1379 n.6.
Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id. at 1379-80.
23 F.3d 345 (11th Cir. 1994).
497 U.S. 358 (1990).
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was dry docked for routine repairs and maintenance at a shipyard on the
Miami River. The fire apparently occurred as the result of welding by
shipyard workers on the vessel. One worker was seriously injured and
two were killed.'
The owner filed a complaint for exoneration from or limitation of
liability for the damages resulting from the fire.81 A death claimant
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, arguing that
the locality test for a maritime tort was not satisfied because fires on dry
docks do not occur on navigable waters, i.e., that a dry dock is an
extension of land. 2 The claimant also contended that the nexus
requirement was not satisfied because the work being done on the vessel
was more extensive than "mere scheduled routine repairs.' s A
magistrate judge found that the vessel was not on navigable waters and
M The district court
concluded that admiralty jurisdiction was lacking."
adopted the report of the magistrate and dismissed the action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.'
On appeal,M in order to determine if the case was cognizable in
admiralty, the Eleventh Circuit had to consider the situs of the fire
(locality test) and the relationship between a fire on a vessel in dry dock
undergoing routine repairs and traditional maritime activity (nexus
test).87 In addressing the locality test, "[whether a vessel in dry dock
on a navigable waterway is in or on navigable waters for purposes of
admiralty jurisdiction," the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was bound
by Supreme Court precedent'M which held "that a vessel in dry dock is
on water, not on land, for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction.8 9
In turning to the nexus test, the Eleventh Circuit framed the issue as
"whether routine repairs to a vessel in dry dock 'bear a significant
relationship [nexus] to traditional maritime activity.' "W According to
the Eleventh Circuit: "The nexus test involves two queries: (1) Did the

80. 23 F.3d at 346.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 346-47.
85. Id. at 347.
86. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's determination that
it was without subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
87. Id. at 348.
88. Id. at 348-49 (citing Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U.S. 171
(1924); Simmons v. The Steamship Jefferson, 215 U.S. 130 (1909); The Robert W. Parsons,
191 U.S. 17 (1903)).
89. Id. at 348.
90. Id. at 349-50 (quoting Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S.
249, 268 (1972)).
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incident have a 'potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce?
and (2) Does a 'substantial relationship' exist between the activity giving
rise to the incident and traditional maritime activity?" 1 In addressing
the first query, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on Sisson in which
the Supreme Court held that a court does not consider the actual effects
on maritime commerce but considers "the general features of the type of
incident involved to determine whether such an incident is likely to
disrupt commercial activity.'8 Following that directive, the Eleventh
Circuit found that, "[tihe fire.., could have spread to the other vessels
and could have93resulted in the obstruction of a navigable waterway-the
Miami River.
In turning to the second query, the court of appeals had to decide if
the routine repair of a vessel in a dry dock had "a substantial relationship to a 'traditional maritime activity."'84 Again the court of appeals
relied on Sisson in which the Supreme Court held that "maintenance of
a vessel at a marina on navigable waters is substantially related to
'traditional maritime activity." 95 The court of appeals found that the
term "maintenance" encompassed the routine repair of a vessel and that
such repair was "a crucial maritime activity.""e Accordingly, the court
found admiralty jurisdiction.97 It is interesting to note that the
Eleventh Circuit was not concerned with the type of dry dock.
In Mink v. Genmar Industries, Inc.,98 the Eleventh Circuit deter-

mined whether maritime law applied to a suit arising out of injuries
suffered by a passenger in a pleasure craft in the Gulf of Mexico."
Mink along with others was a passenger on a demonstration ride
onboard a Wellcraft Scarab 38-foot pleasure boat cruising at approximately eighty miles per hour in the Gulf of Mexico."° While trying to
find a secure position to enjoy the ride Mink lost his balance and was
thrown to the deck. The blow crushed a vertebra and rendered him a
paraplegic."
Almost four years later, Mink filed suit against the manufacturer in
a Florida circuit court. The manufacturer removed the case to federal

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 350.
Id. (citing Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363 (1990)).
Id.
Id. at 350-51 (citing Sisson, 497 U.S. at 365).
Id. at 351 (citing Sisson, 497 U.S. at 367).
Id.
Id.
29 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1543.
Id. at 1544.
Id. at 1545.
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court, sought a dismissal and filed a third party complaint against the
The district court granted
owner seeking indemnity or contribution."
the manufacturer's motion to dismiss the suit as being time barred by
the three year maritime statute of limitations.1 s
In order to save his claim, Mink appealed arguing that admiralty law
did not apply and therefore under Florida law his claim was not time
barred. The Eleventh Circuit relied on Sea Vessel ' 4 and the authorities cited therein to find that the locality test had been met."0 5 All
that was needed was for the tort to have occurred on navigable
waters.'
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the maritime nexus test as stated
in Sisson."'7 The Eleventh Circuit rejected Mink's argument that
there was no actual disruption of maritime commerce and therefore the
nexus requirement was not satisfied.l'e The Eleventh Circuit reminded Mink that the focus was not on the actual effect on maritime
commerce but on the potential effect.'ce In that context the Eleventh
Circuit found that Mink's fall could have interfered
with the operator of
110
the boat and thus directly disrupted navigation.
In addressing the query of whether the potential hazard to maritime
commerce arose out of an activity that bore a substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the
relevant activity was navigation of a vessel on navigable waters and that
was "the very paradigm of traditional maritime activity."'
Mink also argued that neither test had been satisfied because the
alleged design defect occurred on land.1 The Eleventh Circuit found
that argument unavailing because "[t]he defect could not have manifested itself, and the injury could not have occurred until the vessel was
actually operated as a vessel in navigation."'
Precedent from the

102. Id. The third party defendants were an individual and apparently his company
with whom or which the manufacturer had entered into an oral agreement to provide a
vessel which, in turn, would be displayed at the third party defendant's dealership and
automotive races as a form of advertising for the manufacturer. Id. at 1544. For ease of
reference they are referred to herein as "owner.'
103. Id. at 1545 (citing 46 U.S.C. App. § 763a (1994)).
104. Id. (citing Sea Vessel, 23 F.3d at 345).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Sisson, 497 U.S. at 358).
108. Id. at 1546.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. I&
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Supreme Court and other circuit courts of appeal compelled this
result." 4 Since the locality test and the maritime nexus test were met,
the Eleventh Circuit found that admiralty jurisdiction was obtained.115
Thus, substantive admiralty law applied and the three year statute of
limitations for maritime torts governed the cause of action."1
Mink's attempts to place himself without the purview of the three year
statute of limitations for maritime torts by framing his claim as a breach
of contract foundered on the admiralty doctrine of uniformity. 7 Even
if Mink had a cause of action in contract under state law, it was to no
avail since he also had a cause of action in tort which was subject to
substantive admiralty law. Once subject to substantive admiralty law,
Mink could not escape its effects by framing his claim for personal
injuries as a state law cause of action in, contract. 8 Condoning such
a ploy would have trampled on the federal interest in uniformity. This
case is another sobering reminder to counsel to know when admiralty
law applies with its three year statute of limitations.
The third case dealt with the question of personal jurisdiction even
though it arose in the context of a cargo claim. In FrancosteelCorporation v. M/V CHARM," 9 Francosteel, a New York corporation with its
principal place of business in New York City, purchased steel wire rods
from a French manufacturer.' ° In order to transport the rods from
France to Savannah, Georgia, and Jacksonville, Florida, the manufacturer subchartered the MV CHARM from an entity in Rotterdam, which
had itself chartered the vessel from its owner, a Danish shipping
partnership. Another Danish partnership managed. the vessel. The
cargo was loaded in Caen, France pursuant to four bills of lading, and
sail. Four days later the vessel sank with a total loss of
the vessel 12set
1
the cargo.
Francosteel and the manufacturer brought an admiralty and maritime
action pursuant to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 122 against the
owner of the vessel and her manager in personam and against the MV

114. Id. at 1547 (citing East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476
U.S. 858 (1986); Hassinger v. Tideland Electric Membership Corp., 781 F.2d 1022 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1004 (1986); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp., 618 F.2d 319
(5th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Bender Welding & Mach. Works, 581 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1978)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1548.
117. Id. at 1548-49.
118. Id.
119. 19 F.3d 624 (11th Cir. 1994).
120. Id. at 626.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1988)).
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CHARM in rem, claiming unseaworthiness, breach of the contract of
carriage, and negligence.1" The district court dismissed the case for
lack of in personam jurisdiction, both general and specific. 4
The question presented for review by the court of appeals was whether
the exercise of specific in personam jurisdiction over the owner and her
manager complied with the due process requirements of the United
States Constitution.12 5 Noting that Georgia's long arm statute conferred in personam jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the
Due Process Clause, the Eleventh Circuit recited the rule for establishing compliance with due process for in personam jurisdiction purposes:
"(1) the nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum
contacts with the forum state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction will not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 126 The
Eleventh Circuit noted, "[the availability of specific jurisdiction depends
on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."127
The Eleventh Circuit applied the rationale of the Supreme Court as
announced in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.1 2 There the Court
observed that since a contract binds prior negotiations with future
consequences, the determination of whether a party purposefully
established minimum contacts with the forum depends upon the prior
negotiations, the contemplated future consequences, the terms of the
contract, and the parties' actual course of dealing."2 In applying that
rule the court of appeals held, "that the contracts to deliver cargo to a
Georgia port do not constitute sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia
to justify the exercise of specific in personam jurisdiction over [the
owner] and [the manager] in Georgia."1"' The Eleventh Circuit also
supported its holding as to specific jurisdiction with an analysis
appropriate to general jurisdiction as if to say the requirements for
general jurisdiction had not been met either. In doing so the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the only possible connection with Georgia was that

123. Id.
124. Id. Since the district court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on the
jurisdictional issue, Francosteel and the manufacturer were required only to make out a
prima facie case of jurisdiction, i.e., they had to present sufficient evidence to defeat a
motion for directed verdict. Id.
125. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo the dismissal for lack of in personam
jurisdiction. Id.
126. Id. at 627.
127.

Id.

128. Id. at 628; Burger King, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
129. 471 U.S. at 478-79.
130. 19 F.3d at 629.
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the contract called for delivery of the cargo in Georgia.' 3 ' None of the
events giving rise to the cause of action took place in Georgia. None of
the parties was a Georgia resident. There were no direct negotiations
between the owner or manager and the shipper. The shipper, in its
capacity as subcharterer, actually controlled the vessel's movements.
Except for one prior port call to Georgia, the owner and manager had no
physical contact with Georgia. 2
The Eleventh Circuit viewed the owners'/managers' "agreement to
deliver the cargo to Georgia [as] an isolated and sporadic contact with
Georgia [and] not part of a regular practice.""' This decision provides
additional grounds for shipowners and operators to argue that "isolated
and sporadic" port calls by their vessels do not provide the requisite
basis for personal jurisdiction.
III.

LONGSHORE

The sole case decided pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act,' C. G. Willis, Inc. v. Director,' involved the
"second injury" provision of Section 8(f) of the Act." The issue for the
court turned on whether a pre-existing permanent partial disability of
the claimant was manifest to his employer. Claimant Gary Anderson
injured his back on March 20, 1978 while working as a longshoreman for
C. G. Willis, Inc. While being treated by his physicians, Anderson
disclosed that he had had a laminectomy in 1959. Anderson had worked
from 1959 until 1978 when he sustained the injury 13which
was the
7
subject of the suit, after which he was unable to work.
In the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge ("AW"), the
employer did not contend that it was actually aware of the pre-existing
back condition prior to the injury in question. Rather than submitting

131. Id. at 628.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1986).
135. 31 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1994).
136. Id. at 1173 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 908(f)). That section provides in pertinent part:
(1) In any case in which an employee having an existing permanent partial
disability suffers injury, the employer shall provide compensation for such
disability as is found to be attributable to that injury .... In ... cases of total
permanent disability or of death, found not to be due solely to that injury, of an
employee having an existing permanent partial disability, the employer shall
provide... compensation payments or death benefits for one hundred and four
weeks only.
33 U.S.C. § 908(n.
137. 31 F.3d at 1113.
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pre-injury records to substantiate the pre-existing back condition, the
employer relied solely upon a surgical scar on Anderson's back as proof
that Anderson's pre-existing back condition was manifest."s
The ALJ found that Anderson's second injury resulted in a permanent
total disability, that the pre-existing back injury resulted in a permanent
partial disability, that the second injury combined with the pre-existing
back injury to cause a greater disability than the second injury alone,
but found no grounds upon which to posit a finding that the pre-existing
disability was manifest to the employer at the time Anderson was
hired."9 While no medical records were submitted at the hearing,
counsel for the employer stated that he had obtained some medical
records but they were of such poor quality that counsel had returned
them asking that they be deciphered. According to the ALJ, the most
that could4 be said for such evidence was that Anderson had been in the
hospital."

The AL rejected the employer's contention that the scar on Anderson's back would have put the employer on notice of a prior surgery,
saying that, "the scar could have resulted from other causes and
[Anderson] was not given a physical examination prior to employment.""" Essentially, the AL concluded that since the medical
documentation of Anderson's 1959 surgery was based entirely on what
he told his examining physicians after the 1978 accident, the employer
did not know and could not have learned from the medical records in
existence on or before March 20, 1978, that Anderson had had back
surgery in 1959.142 Accordingly, the prior injury was not manifest and
the ALl denied the limitation of liability provided by the second injury
provision of the Act.'
The Benefits Review Board affirmed, holding
that, "the mere existence of a scar without any relevant diagnosis prior
to March 20, 1978, is not sufficient."'
The Eleventh Circuit began its discussion by stating, "[tihe purpose of
section 8(f) is to discourage discrimination against disabled workers." 45 With that purpose in mind, the court of appeals observed that
a majority of the federal circuits, including the Eleventh, requires that
the pre-existing disability be manifest to the employer prior to the

138.

Id. at 1113-14.

139. Id. at 1114.
140. Id.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1114-15.
Id. at 1115.
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compensable injury in order to receive relief under section 8(f).146 If
the purpose of section 8(f) is to encourage employers to hire disabled
workers, the time at which the pre-existing injury should be manifest is
at the time of hiring. That is how the AU expressed it.4 In other
words, if the existing disability was not manifest at the time of hiring,
it could not cause or support discrimination against a disabled worker.
In the statement of the "manifest" rule to which the panel cited, there
was no reference to time. The Eleventh Circuit did refine that statement
by adding the words "prior to the compensable injury." S Thus while
the Eleventh Circuit clarified its previous statement of the rule it did not
go far enough.
The Eleventh Circuit then recited the rule under which an employer
is entitled to relief under section 8(f),4 noting that the only issue
before the court was whether the pre-existing disability was manifest to
the employer prior to the compensable injury. 50 Since the employer
did not have actual knowledge of Anderson's pre-existing disability, the
Eleventh Circuit had to determine whether the employer had constructive knowledge of that condition because of the scar on Anderson's back,
i.e., whether a scar on Anderson's back was sufficient
to make his
15
pre-existing back condition manifest to the employer. 1
Although the Eleventh Circuit mentioned that some courts had
embraced an objective standard of evidence of the disability, the court
of appeals noted that it had not adopted such standard but even if it
had, the employer could not meet it. 2 The court of appeals rejected
the contention that a disability was manifest "merely because it was
'discoverable,' that is, it might have been discovered had the proper
testing been performed."'5 3 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit applied the
rationale of the Fifth Circuit which held, "[tihe question is whether the
condition was discoverable by the employer based on then existing
medical records available to it."'
Since the employer did not offer

146.

Id.

147. Id. at 1114.
148. Id. at 1115.
149. Id. at 1116. The employer is entitled to relief upon proof "(1) that the employee
had a preexisting, permanent partial disability; (2) that this preexisting disability was
manifest to the employer prior to the compensable injury; and (3) that the preexisting

disability contributed to the seriousness of the compensable injury." Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1116-17.
153. Id. at 1117.
154. Id. (quoting Eymard & Sons Shipyard v. Smith, 862 F.2d 1220, 1224 (5th Cir.
1989)).
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any medical records pre-dating the 1978 injury, it failed to demonstrate
that there was objective evidence of Anderson's back condition in the
records available to it. The Eleventh Circuit went on to note, "that the
mere presence of a scar on Anderson's back is insufficient to render his
back condition 'manifest' to his employer under the objective standard
applied [by other courts]."" Implicit in the court's opinion was that
if the employer had produced legible medical records establishing the
laminectomy in 1959, that would have been sufficient to establish that
the previous condition was manifest to the employer.'"
IV

MARITIME LIENS

Although the issue of whether the Maritime Commercial Instruments
and Lien Act ("MCILA")' 57 permits an in personam action against the
United States based on in rem principles was decided in Bonanni Ship
Supply, Inc. v. United States,15 this issue continues to be a source of
litigation in this circuit, primarily because the Government will not give
up. In 9 Turecamo of Savannah, Inc. v. United States, the same issue
15
arose.
In order to have the YFNB-33 Seacon, a public vessel, towed from
Mayport, Florida to the United States naval facility in Portsmouth,
Virginia, the Government, through the Department of Defense, Military
Traffic Management Command, contracted with Panocean Marine, Inc.
which, through a subsidiary, contracted with Turecamo for the movement. Government personnel approved the use of the tug nominated by
Turecamo and that tug delivered the YFNB-33 Seacon to Portsmouth in
accordance with the bill of lading issued by the Government." °
When Turecamo was paid only $20,800 of the $55,800 to which it was
entitled, it filed suit pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act"6 ' to
recover the balance, alleging that it had provided necessaries to the
vessel within the purview of MCILA and consequently had an in
personam action pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 742.162 With Bonanni as

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301-43 (1988).
158. 959 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1992).
159. 36 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 1994).
160. Id. at 1084.
161. Id.; 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 741-752 (1988).
162. 36 F.3d at 1084; 46 U.S.C. § 742 provides:
In cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo
were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were
involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate noiury
proceeding in personam may be brought against the United States .... Such
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binding precedent, the district court entered summary judgment for
Turecamo, finding that it had met its burden under the MCILA and was
therefore entitled to recover in personam.1'
The Eleventh Circuit cited Bonanni as good authority and affirmed the
Before doing so, the court conducted an in
district court's decision.'
depth analysis of the Bonanni court's interpretation of MCILA. That
analysis cast doubt on the holding of the prior panel. The court invited
en banc reconsideration of the rule announced in Bonanni and cited five
reasons: (1) the legislative history which stated that the provision
"'makes no substantive change in the law'" was written when the Act
did not expressly exclude public vessels; (2) while the main purpose of
the Act was to codify existing maritime law, Congress noted that many
substantive changes were made; (3) the legislative history of the 1989
Amendment expressly states Congress' intent that "'a claim may not be
brought either in personam or in rem on a maritime lien theory against
a public vessel"; (4) once Congress has expressly stated its intent to
codify a rule prohibiting both in personam and in rem actions asserting
maritime liens against public vessels, Congress' view of the law existing
at the time of the amendment should not be second-guessed; and (5)
whatever Congress' interpretation of the existing law was, it has now
made clear that a claim cannot be brought on a maritime lien theory
Following the Eleventh Circuit's affirmance
against a public vessel.'
of the district court's holding, the Government filed a petition for
rehearing en banc, which was denied.
More often than not, the use of the maritime lien as a means of
obtaining payment for goods and services provided to a vessel occurs
when the vessel interests have absconded or gone broke. In situations
involving the Government, it is usually the prime contractor who has
failed to pay the subcontractor after having received the money from the
Government. While it is unfortunate for any party to have to pay twice
for any goods or services rendered to the vessel, that can happen when
someone other than the lienholder is paid. What is not apparent from
the Eleventh Circuit opinion is why the Government should be treated
differently from every other entity in similar circumstances.

suits shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the district in
which the parties so suing, or any of them, reside or have their principal place of
business in the United States, or in which the vessel or cargo charged with
liability is found.
46 U.S.C. § 742.
163. 36 F.3d at 1085.
164. Id. at 1088.
165. Id. at 1087-88.
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V. SALVAGE

Two cases involving salvage matters were decided on the same day by
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In United States v. Fisher,'
the United States brought suit against marine salvors seeking damages
and a preliminary injunction to prohibit the salvors from violating the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act. 7 ("Sanctuaries
Act") and the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and Protection
Act " ' ("Florida Keys Act) by using prop wash deflectors' 9 in their
salvage operations in an area within the boundaries of the Florida Keys
Sanctuary.170 The matter was referred to a magistrate judge before
whom the Government presented expert testimony that the sanctuary
had been irreparably injured."' Those experts described the damage
to fans,
sponges and historic artifacts unearthed by prop wash deflec72
tors.1

The salvors stipulated that they had used prop wash deflectors in such
areas and that they had "created at least 100 depressions' in the sea
bed."1'7 The magistrate judge held that the Government was "substantially likely to prevail on its § 1443 claim against the [salvors]," that the
affected seagrass environments were clearly "sanctuary resources" under
the Sanctuaries Act, that "irreparable injury would result if the Fishers'
activities were not preliminarily enjoined and that a preliminary
injunction would serve the public interest."174 However, the magistrate
judge recommended that only the salvors' use of prop wash deflectors
be enjoined and that they be allowed to pursue their livelihood by using
other salvage techniques in the sanctuary.7 7 The district court issued
a preliminary injunction against the salvors.' 76

166. 22 F.3d 262 (11th Cir. 1994).
167.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445 (1984).

168. Pub. L. No. 101-605, 104 Stat. 3089 (1990). Both Acts were later amended by the
Oceans Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-587, 106 Stat. 5039 (1992).
169. 22 F.3d at 265. Prop wash deflectors direct propeller wash to remove overburden,
sediments, and sea grass in which artifacts are contained. Id.
170. Id. at 263.
171. Id. at 265.
172. Id. at 266.
173. Id. at 265.
174. Id. at 266.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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The court of appeals recited the four factors that the Government must
prove to obtain a preliminary injunction 7 and noted that the salvors
made no attempt to show that the district court misapplied any of those
factors. 7 " Instead, the salvors mounted a five-pronged defense: (1) that
the Florida Keys Sanctuary cannot become operative until the Secretary
of Commerce has promulgated a management plan, (2) that the
Government cannot bring an enforcement action until the Secretary of
Commerce has promulgated a management plan for the sanctuary that
includes enforcement activity, (3) that the Government cannot bring an
enforcement action until the Secretary of Commerce has filed an
environmental impact statement, (4) that they were exonerated because
of a statutory exclusion for those authorized by permit in existence prior
to the designation of the sanctuary, and (5) that their prior history of
salvage operations constituted a defense. 79
The court of appeals rejected each of the salvors' defenses." 0 First,
the Eleventh Circuit found "that the Florida Keys Act itself established
the Florida Keys Sanctuary and did not require any further action by
the Administration for the Sanctuary to come into existence." 18' The
salvors' contention that Congressional designation of the Florida Keys
Sanctuary did not take effect until the Administration had promulgated
a management plan, was erroneous. 182 The Congress, by means of the
Florida Keys Act, designated the sanctuary and directed that it be
managed and regulated as if it had been designated pursuant to the
Sanctuary Act. According to the Eleventh Circuit this did not mean that
to become effective, Congress had to observe any of the requirements for
effectuating its designation as would be incumbent on the Secretary of
Commerce if the designation had come about pursuant to the Sanctuaries Act.'83

. 177. Id. The grant of a preliminary injunction was reviewed for a clear abuse of

discretion. Id.
178. Id. The court said that the Government must show:
(1) that it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the injury to the government from
denial of injunctive relief outweighs the damage to the other party if it is granted; and (4)
that the injunction will not harm the public interest. Id. at 267.
179. Id. at 267-70.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 267.
182. Id. at 268.
183. Id.
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Second, the Eleventh Circuit held that the enforcement provisions in
Section 1434(a)(1)'"' to which the salvors referred (no enforcement
action without a management plan including enforcement activity) apply
to a sanctuary that the Secretary of Commerce has proposed to
In
designate, and not to one that Congress itself designated.855
rejecting that defense, the Eleventh Circuit recited the requirements for
the bringing of an enforcement action by the Government: "(1) the
Secretary's determination of an imminent risk of destruction or loss of,
or injury to, a sanctuary resource and (2) a request by the Secretary to
the Attorney General to bring an enforcement action. " ' In short, the
Eleventh Circuit found that there was nothing in the statute which
required the Secretary of Commerce to have informed Congress about his
enforcement plans for the sanctuary before filing suit."18
Third, the Eleventh Circuit found that the requirement for an
environmental impact statement related only "to a sanctuary designated
"
by the Secretary [of Commerce], not to one designated by Congress. lse
Fourth, the Eleventh Circuit held that the salvors could not come within
the prior permit exclusion since they did not have a permit covering the
use of prop wash deflectors in the sanctuary. 8 9 The salvors' attempt
to overcome their lack of a permit by claiming that to have applied for
a permit would have been a useless act since no procedures had been
adopted for the issuance of permits and, in fact, no permits were being
issued, was unavailing.1" Finally, the Eleventh Circuit brushed aside
the salvors' contention that their history of prior salvage operations
constituted a defense. 91
While the second salvage case arose in the context of a salvage claim,
the issue on appeal was whether an opinion issued during the appeal
should be vacated when the case was settled after the appellate mandate
192
had issued. In FlagshipMarine Services, Inc. v. Belcher Towing Co.,
the salvor brought a maritime salvage claim against Belcher for the

184. Section 1434(aXl) of the Sanctuaries Act provided in part: "In proposing to
designate a national marine sanctuary, the Secretary shall ... submit ... the draft
management plan detailing the proposed goals and objectives, management responsibilities,
resource studies, interpretive and educational programs, and enforcement, including
surveillance activities for the area." 16 U.S.C. § 1434(a)(1) (1992).
185. 22 F.3d at 268.
186. Id. at 269.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 269-70.
190. Id. at 270.
191. Id.
192. 23 F.3d 341 (11th Cir. 1994).
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voluntary salvage of Belcher's tug. The district court awarded $125,000
for the voluntary salvage.193 On the first appeal the Eleventh Circuit
found that the parties had an oral contract that precluded recovery for
voluntary salvage and reversed the award."9
On remand the district court held an evidentiary hearing and entered
a judgment in favor of the salvor for $24,281.5 The salvor appealed,
but before the case was argued, it settled.1
The Eleventh Circuit
granted the salvor's motion to dismiss the appeal and vacated the
opinion in the prior appeal."' The issue of whether the prior panel
opinion should have been vacated came before the court of appeals on
the motion of Belcher to reinstate precedent. The court of appeals
pointed out that the case did not settle until after the mandate had
issued and the case was in the district court on remand.'
Under
those circumstances there was a "live case or controversy."'
The
court of appeals specifically said:
Until the mandate issues, an appellate judgment is not final; the
decision reached in the opinion may be revised by the panel, or
reconsidered by the en banc court or certiorari may be granted by the
Supreme Court. When a case settles before the end of the appellate
process, any opinion that has been produced should be vacated. It is
a different story, however, where the appellate judgment has become
final before the case settles. By surviving exposure to the full appellate
process, the prior panel decision becomes the law of the circuit, and
anything that happens thereafter on remand does not vitiate the effect
of the prior appellate decision as precedent. 2°
While not critical to this case, counsel need to remember that the
mandate does not necessarily issue at the same time as the appellate
opinion."°

193. Id. at 342.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 provides that issuance of the mandate can
take place up to twenty-one days after the entry of judgment unless otherwise ordered.
FED. R. APP. P. 41.

